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ABSTRACT OF THESIS 
 
THE EFFECTS OF ESCALATED COCAINE INTAKE ON DECISION-MAKING 
DYNAMICS 
 
Cocaine Use Disorder (CUD) is characterized partly by the use of cocaine at the 
expense of other alternatives, in other words, it is a decision-making pathology (Kalivas 
& Volkow, 2005). Concurrent choice tasks assess decision-making in a dynamic scenario 
that more closely resembles real life. Value-based decision-making is an important facet 
of understanding the addictive properties of drugs of abuse. In order to compare two 
value-based theories of addiction (habit theory and relative value theory), a concurrent 
choice task was run in tandem with an escalation procedure. First, animals were trained 
on a choice task until stable, then trained on to self-administer cocaine (0.3mg/kg to the 
animal’s weight) using a fixed ratio 1 schedule under 1-hr access. For the escalation 
procedure, some animals remained on 1-hr access and others were given 6-hr access to 
cocaine for 21 days. Then all rats returned to 1-hr access. The animals were trained such 
that they performed the choice task in the morning (while not under the influence of 
drugs) and then after a rest in the home cage, were put back into the operant boxes for 
self-administration sessions.  
Escalation of cocaine intake was evident in the 6-hr exposed animals but intake 
was stable in the 1-hr exposure animals. The choice behavior between the two groups did 
not differ, despite difference in intake between the groups. Indicating that despite 
dysregulated cocaine intake, value-based decision-making and goal-directed behavior 
remained intact. This supports the idea of looking beyond habit theory as the sole 
explanation for the change in decision-making behavior seen in CUD. 
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CHAPTER 1.  INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Cocaine 
Cocaine is one of the most commonly used stimulants in Europe and the United 
States (European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and Drug Addiction (EMCDDA), 2020; 
Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), 2020). In 
2019, there were an estimated 5.5 million people, 2%, in the United States (SAMHSA, 
2020) and 4.3 million people, 1.3%, in Europe who had used cocaine in the past year 
(EMCDDA, 2020). Of those who used cocaine in the U.S., 1 million transitioned from 
controlled drug use to developing Cocaine Use Disorder (CUD) (SAMHA,2020). The 
development of CUD causes serious negative impact on many areas of patient’s lives. For 
example, the Substance Use Disorder (SUD) diagnosis in the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.; DSM–5; American Psychiatric Association, 2013) 
includes not only biological factors such as increased craving, tolerance, and withdrawal 
but also impairments in social, occupational, and recreational obligations as well as 
hazardous health effects. Each of these symptoms is tallied to garner a score of mild, 
moderate, or severe to determine how profoundly the drug-use is affecting the patient. 
While each patient may present with different symptomology and severity, the chronic, 
relapsing nature of SUDs makes it a serious detriment to patient’s lives.  
  CUD not only has deleterious effects for those suffering from addiction but also 
has serious effects on society. In 2018, 14,666 Americans died of cocaine-related 
overdose out of more than 67,300 total drug-involved overdoses (Center for Disease 
Control, 2020). In addition to the loss of life, illicit drug use is thought to cost $193 
billion to society annually due to crime ($61 billion), lost work productivity ($120 
billion), and health care ($11 billion; National Drug Threat Assessment, 2011). 
Additionally, since cocaine is classified as a Schedule II drug according to the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), its possession and sale are criminal offenses and 
oftentimes associated with other crimes. According to the National Drug Threat Survey 




the updated 2019 assessment says the stimulant threat is worsening and becoming more 
widespread (Drug Enforcement Administration, 2019). Therefore, understanding and 
creating treatments for CUD is of significant interest to society as a whole. 
1.1.1 Mechanism of Action  
Cocaine, like other drugs of abuse, produces feelings of “high” or “euphoria” which 
patients describe as pleasurable and reinforcing. These feelings drive the initial desire to 
take the drug. This euphoric effect is produced by indirectly stimulating the monoamine 
system in the brain. Although cocaine has a structure similar to that of the endogenous 
catecholamine neurotransmitters dopamine (DA) and norepinephrine (NE), it cannot 
directly activate the neuronal receptors on the postsynaptic neurons that they bind to. 
Instead, it makes more of the naturally occurring neurotransmitters available by blocking 
their reuptake from the synapse via the transporter. Thus, allowing the DA or NE to 
remain in the synapse longer and continue to bind to the post-synaptic receptors. Cocaine 
is a potent inhibitor of the dopamine transporter (DAT) and has been shown to 
significantly elevate the basal DA levels in the nucleus accumbens (NAc) (Wise, 1987, 
1988; Di Chiara & Imperato, 1988).  
The increase in extracellular DA has been associated with both the rewarding and 
motoric effects of stimulants. The motoric effects include dose-dependent increases in 
activity in rodents, oftentimes seen as running. At higher doses, though, animals may 
engage in stereotypy, or repetitive actions such as head swaying, sniffing or licking. 
Although more common in amphetamine users, punding, or repetitive and impulsive 
behaviors, has also been noted in humans (Fasano et al., 2008). Punding was first noticed 
in patients with Parkinson’s disease triggered by their DA replacement therapies (Black 
& Friedman, 2006). Both stimulants and DA replacement therapies increase the amount 
of DA in the synapse, giving further evidence that DA plays an important role in the 
effects of drugs of abuse. Additionally, in studies using intra-cranial self-stimulation 
(ICSS), it was found that humans and rats will learn to respond for direct electrical 
stimulation of the medial forebrain bundle (MFB); which includes dopaminergic 
projections from the hypothalamus to the ventral tegmental area (VTA) (Old & Milner, 




release in the NAc and is enhanced by drugs that increase extracellular DA (Phillips, 
Blaha, & Fibiger,1989; Fiorino et al., 1993; You & Wise, 2001; Cheer et al., 2005; 
Hernandez et al., 2012). These findings, coupled with the fact that humans report that 
they find ICSS stimulation pleasurable, led to the linkage of these dopaminergic neurons 
in the midbrain with the reward circuitry. Similarly, it was found that the mesolimbic 
pathway, which is comprised of the VTA and projections to the ventral striatum, is 
critical for the rewarding effects of drugs of abuse (Wise & Rompré, 1989; Wise, 2009). 
Further studies with moveable-electrodes confirmed that stimulation along the 
mesostriatal (substantia nigra to dorsal striatum) and mesocortical (VTA to frontal 
cortex) pathways are also associated with drug reward and addiction (Wise, 2009; Prado-
Alacá & Wise, 1984a; Prado-Alacá, Streather, & Wise, 1984). In sum, midbrain DA 
neurons play a vital role in producing the rewarding effects of drugs of abuse.  
 Midbrain DA neurons are also thought to be involved in the encoding of 
information about the value of rewarding events. Specifically, their firing rate is thought 
to encode reward prediction error (RPE) and guide decision-making in reinforcement 
learning models (RL; Schultz et al., 1997; Hollerman & Schultz; 1998; Nakahara et al. 
2004; Bayer & Glimcher, 2005). In RL models, the value of a given outcome is updated 
on a trial-by-trial basis based on the differences between the expected and experienced 
outcomes (Rescorla & Wagner, 1972; Sutton & Barto, 1998). The set of average values 
of different rewards over a series of trials is called a value function. It is presumed that 
the set of value functions for a given environment, based on past experiences, is used to 
predict the likelihood of future reward or punishment.  The RPE modulates those 
predictions by encoding how “surprising” the received outcome was, or how much it 
differed from the predicted outcome based on previous trials. A reward such as an 
infusion of a drug can vary on multiple dimensions such as its magnitude, the probability 
that it will be delivered, the delay to being delivered, etc. These dimensions can then be 
manipulated to change the value of the reward. For example, if the delivered infusion is 
made more valuable by a change in magnitude (e.g. the dose is higher than expected), 
there would be positive RPE and the firing rate of the DA neurons would increase. On the 
other hand, if the reward were made less valuable by increasing the delay to delivery, 




1997). If the same reward is presented over and over again with no change in any of the 
reward dimensions, there would be no RPE and the firing rate would decrease or stay 
stable at some low firing rate (Hollerman & Schultz, 1998). A study by Rutledge et al. 
(2009) confirmed that phasic DA activity is involved in encoding RPE in Parkinson’s 
patients taking L-DOPA using a dynamic foraging task. With these studies, it is clear that 
manipulations of value via alterations in one or more reward dimensions affect the RPE 
and firing rate of the midbrain DA neurons. Since cocaine acts on these midbrain DA 
neurons that play a part in both the rewarding effects of the drug and the encoding of 
value, RL models that use value to predict choice behavior play an important role in 
understanding how the value of drug guides decision-making behaviors related to SUD. 
1.2 Common Procedures in Substance Abuse Research 
To study the rewarding effects of drugs and decision-making processes related to 
drug abuse, researchers have utilized many types of procedures that uncover different 
aspects of SUD. Below are some commonly used procedures, citing their benefits as well 
as shortcomings in order to determine which procedures would be best suited to measure 
relative value changes over the course of a rodent model of SUD. 
1.2.1 Conditioned Place Preference  
One of the earliest procedures developed to measure the effects of drugs of abuse is 
conditioned place preference (CPP; Spragg, 1940) where animals are exposed to 
experimenter administered drug as a passive measure of determining the rewarding 
effects of different drug or non-drug rewards (Carr et al. 1989; Calcagnetti & Schechter, 
1992; Tzschentke, 1998). To pair the subjective effects of the drug (unconditioned 
stimulus) with that of the chamber stimulus context (e.g. particular flooring, wall 
patterning, or set of olfactory cues; conditioned stimulus), the animal is administered the 
drug and then placed in one side of a three-chamber box. The opposite side of the 
chamber, which has its own unique stimulus context, is then paired with saline, vehicle, 
or no drug. After exposure to both sides, animals are placed into the middle chamber and 
allowed to freely access both the drug-paired and non-drug-paired chambers. An increase 




animal experienced that context was rewarding - i.e. more time spent on the drug-paired 
chamber indicates that the subjective drug effects were rewarding. CPP is a tool that can 
quickly be used to determine if the effects of a drug are rewarding or aversive 
(Tzschentke, 1998; Ettenberg et al., 1999; Tsuji et al., 1996). But due to the passive 
nature of the drug administration, and discordance between CPP and self-administration 
as reviewed in Bardo and Bevins (2000), CPP bears little face validity to the drug-taking 
behavior seen in human substance use disorders.  
1.2.2  Self-Administration 
In contrast to the passive administration of the drug in CPP, animal self-
administration procedures were developed in rats (Weeks, 1962), and monkeys (Schuster 
& Thompson, 1969) where the administration and history of drug experience are under 
the control of the animal. In these procedures, the animal is implanted with an indwelling 
jugular catheter with which they are able to administer a drug themselves by emitting an 
operant response (i.e. lever press, or other response on a manipulandum), which will 
activate a pump connected to a syringe filled with the drug to deliver a specific dosage. In 
this procedure, the drug functions as a reinforcing stimulus, meaning that it increases 
operant responses that lead to the delivery of the drug. Many self-administration studies 
have demonstrated that drugs of abuse function as reinforcers (see Schuster & Thompson, 
1969 for review; Weeks, 1961,1962; Pickens & Thompson, 1966). From the basic self-
administration procedure, there have been a variety of offshoot procedures developed to 
investigate other facets of drug valuation.  
1.2.3  Escalation Model 
One of these is the escalation model developed by Ahmed & Koob (1998). In this 
model, animals are given either short (10min, 1hr) or longer (60min, 6hr, sometimes 
12hr) access to self-administer drugs. The longer access sessions are thought to produce a 
gradual dysregulation of drug intake during self-administration, such that the animals 
with longer access take more drug than their shorter access counterparts and will show 
enhanced reinstatement (Ferrario et al., 2005; Kippin, Fuchs, & See, 2006; Knackstedt & 




(Pelloux, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2007; Deroche-Gamonet, Belin, & Piazza, 2004) The 
escalation of drug intake and resistance to punishment is thought to show a deviation 
from normal reward-based decision-making indicative of SUD (Edwards & Koob, 2013).   
1.2.4  Progressive Ratio 
Another derivation of the traditional self-administration paradigm is the progressive 
ratio (PR) schedule (Hodos, 1961; Richardson & Roberts, 1996) in which the number of 
responses required to deliver a dose of the drug increases systematically until the animal 
no longer completes the response requirement in a given time period. This maximum-
response value is called the breakpoint, which serves as a measure of reinforcer efficacy. 
The PR schedule can be used to evaluate the reinforcing efficacy of drugs by comparing 
the breakpoints of a series of doses in a dose-response curve (Richardson & Roberts, 
1996). A higher breakpoint indicates that the animal will “work harder” for a given dose 
and thus that dose is a more effective reinforcer. PR measures are based on the idea that 
the value of the reinforcer lies in how hard the animal will work to obtain it. 
1.2.5 Demand Schedule 
Similar to PR schedules, the reinforcing value of a drug can be determined by the 
extent to which it is sensitive or insensitive to changes in price. In demand analyses, price 
is defined as the amount of monetary expense, time, or effort required to obtain a 
commodity. In non-human animal studies, price is often manipulated by increasing the 
Fixed Ratio (FR requirement to earn a reinforcer, making these tasks look very similar to 
PR schedules. However, in these procedures, the manipulation of interest is unit price; 
here defined as the number of responses required divided by the reinforcer magnitude, or 
the dose of the reinforcer. Unit price can also be conceptualized as the relation of cost-
benefit. The effect of changing the unit price on drug-taking behavior is approximated by 
the elasticity of demand, the consumption of a commodity as a function of the unit price 
required to acquire it (Hursh & Roma, 2016). Generally, as the unit price for a 
commodity is increased, the consumption of that commodity decreases. At low unit 
prices consumption is high and insensitive, or inelastic, meaning that changes in unit 




the responding reaches a point in which it becomes elastic, meaning it is very sensitive to 
unit price, and responding for the commodity decreases as the unit price continues to rise 
(Hursh & Roma, 2013). This relationship can be described by the following equation 
characterized by Hursh and Silberberg (2008) called the demand curve: 
log𝑄𝑄 = log𝑄𝑄0 + 𝑘𝑘(𝑒𝑒−𝛼𝛼𝑄𝑄0𝐶𝐶 − 1)                                         (1) 
where Q is consumption, Q0 is consumption at zero cost, C is unit price, ⍺ is 
demand elasticity, and k is a scaling constant associated with consumption. The slope of 
the curve is determined by k and ⍺, but because k is a constant, changes in elasticity are 
determined by ⍺. This model not only characterizes intake of commodities when they are 
free (Q0) but also how intake will change as a function of increased price (⍺).  When 
graphed as a demand curve, a more elastic reinforcer will show steeper slopes compared 
to an inelastic one. By normalizing these plots, two reinforcers, or multiple doses of the 
same drug, can be shown on the same graph (Hursh & Winger, 1995; Winger et al., 
2006). Although each drug is given in isolation, and therefore these graphs cannot 
determine preference between doses or drugs, fitting a demand model to the data may 
begin to uncover differences that exist in terms of reinforcing efficacy. From these 
values, it is possible to compare how alterations in the environment change the elasticity 
of drug responding and thus, the drug’s reinforcing efficacy in different scenarios. 
1.3  Theoretical and Pragmatic Issues with Single Schedules  
All of the above approaches have their uses for answering specific questions, but 
because they are all quantifying the reward value of a single commodity (i.e. a single 
schedule), they all suffer similar theoretical issues and none can compute the relative 
value of the commodity as it exists in different environments.  
1.3.1 Rate Measures are not  dissociable From Preference   
Using single schedules will often produce a bitonic dose-response curve or 
“inverted U-shaped” where the lowest and highest doses produce lower self-
administration levels than the mid-range dose(s), leading to the conclusion that 




given the choice between a low and high dose, the higher dose will be chosen almost 
exclusively (Iglauer & Woods, 1974; Johanson & Schuster, 1975; Beckmann, Chow, & 
Hutsell, 2019). This disconnect between the findings of rate-based measures of reward 
efficacy and that of choice measures show that single-schedule paradigms are susceptible 
to other effects that are independent of the value of the commodity. These independent 
effects are often referred to as direct effects (Katz, 1989). 
1.3.1.1 Direct Effects: Satiety 
 One possible explanation for the decrease in responding on the descending limb of 
the dose-response curve is satiety. This effect is most intuitively explained through 
experiences with non-drug rewards. As described in Killeen and Reilly (2001), animals 
regulate responding for food to create a homeostatic balance, up-regulating behavior 
when driven by a state of hunger and down-regulating when in a state of surfeit. The 
threshold for increasing or decreasing responding is called satiation and is centered 
around the set point. For example, when hungry at the beginning of a meal we eat 
quickly, then slow down towards the end of the meal as we become satiated. Finally, we 
stop completely, until we are hungry again. The cessation of responding after surpassing 
the upper satiation limit is called the post-reinforcement pause (PRP). The same pattern 
of responding can be seen in the self-administration of drugs. It has been shown that 
animals will titrate their intake of cocaine to maintain a steady-state of drug level in the 
body (Gerber & Wise, 1989; Richardson & Roberts, 1996). Tsibulsky & Norman (1999) 
characterized the relationship between cocaine dose and the length of the mean inter-
injection interval, or PRP, as non-linear. Human cocaine self-administration showed a 
similar non-linear relationship between cocaine dose and PRP (Angarita et al., 2010). 
When using larger doses of the drug the animal reaches the satiation point (termed 
“satiety threshold” by Tsibulsky & Norman (1999)) more quickly and the PRP will be 
long until the metabolism of the drug moves the animal back below the action threshold 
and it begins to respond again. Whereas when using smaller doses of the drug, the animal 
may never reach satiation and respond continuously. This regulation system would then 
imply that the differences in the rates of responding for the two doses seen in rate-




reinforcers than higher doses), but instead the difference in rates is due to the clearance of 
the drug and maintenance of a steady-state.   
1.3.1.2 Direct Effects: Motoric Effects  
Oftentimes, the effects of the drug on the body may change the mobility of the 
animal, and when using a single schedule, it is impossible to disentangle the changes in 
mobility from changes in value. According to rate-dependent measures of value, 
increases in the rate of responding are taken to mean that the drug or dose has high 
reinforcing efficacy and low response rates are associated with low efficacy; however, 
this may be misleading when considering other factors that could account for changes in 
response rate. For example, a stimulant may increase overall activity, which may be 
expressed as increased operant responding, whereas an opioid may decrease overall 
activity and lead to a decrease in operant responding. In both cases, the direct effects of 
the drugs will have altered the response rates, but this change was not due to differences’ 
in the value of the drug doses.  
To combat the conflation of motoric and rewarding effects, many studies use 
supplementary locomotor assays to attempt to control for the motoric effects of drugs. 
These studies assume a 1:1 relation between locomotor activity and operant responding - 
i.e increased locomotion will be associated with increased operant responses. However, it 
has been shown that drug-induced locomotor sensitization and self-administration rates 
are dissociable. In a study using the escalation model of CUD, it was found that for 
longer-access animals the level of cocaine self-administration was not associated with an 
increase in psychomotor sensitization and that for the shorter-access animals the amount 
of sensitization was negatively correlated with levels of cocaine self-administration 
(Ahmed & Cador, 2006). The same finding remained even during reinstatement tests 
after a 14-day withdrawal period (Ben-Shahar, Ahmed, Koob, & Ettenberg, 2004).  In a 
further study, 1 month after the last self-administration session, injections of cocaine 
produced increased locomotor activity relative to saline, but there was no correlation 
between previous self-administration experience (6-hr, 1-hr, acute cocaine) and the 




additional locomotor assays are not enough to control for the coupling of motoric and 
rewarding effects when using single schedules.  
1.3.2 Invocation of the Cardinal Scale  
The main theoretical issue regarding single schedules is that offering a commodity 
via a single schedule disregards that all rewards must be viewed in context. The 
contextual dependency of decisions is characterized in behavioral economics (e.g., 
Glimcher, 2011; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979) and represents the theoretical assumption 
that all choices must be viewed as relative to other available commodities. By ignoring 
that context, single schedules assume that there is a ‘True’, invariant value of a 
commodity that can be uncovered and quantified. One common invocation of the cardinal 
scale is the use of essential value in economic demand models. In Equation (1), the 
demand equation (Hursh & Silberberg, 2008), essential value is the elasticity of a 
commodity (𝛼𝛼) across the unidimensional space of unit price after normalizing the 
differences in maximum consumption (Q0). The goal of essential value is to manipulate 
unit price to determine a single measure of reward value that can then be used to compare 
different commodities (e.g. Christensen, et al., 2008a; Schwartz et al. 2019; Smethells, 
Harris, Burroughs, Hursh, & LeSage, 2018) or characterize ‘addiction-like’ 
vulnerabilities in decision-making (e.g. Christensen, et al., 2008b; Bentzley, Jhou, & 
Aston-Jones, 2014; Murphy, Mackillop, Skidmore, & Pederson, 2009) 
The characterization of value as an absolute, however appealing, is flawed in that it 
ignores that different dimensions (i.e. effort, magnitude, delay, probability, etc.) are not 
psychophysically scaled the same (Stevens, 1957). For example, unit price deals with 
cost, otherwise known as effort. If essential value does indeed represent an absolute 
measure then altering another dimension such as magnitude so that the unit prices are 
equivalent should lead to the same essential values. However, manipulating cost and 
magnitude produce different estimates of essential value (Smith, Rupprecht, Sved, & 
Donny, 2016), and subject’s choices between commodities with identical unit prices but 
different cost or magnitude are not equivalent (Madden, Bickel, & Jacobs, 2000). 
Additionally, essential value can be altered by the presence of other concurrent 




dependent on the decision-making context. Single schedules, by offering drugs in 
isolation, miss a vital facet of reward valuation that is crucial to understanding drug 
value; all decision contexts include some variant of choice alternatives, and valuation of 
any reward is only understood in reference to those alternatives.  
1.4 Concurrent schedules  
To combat the pragmatic and theoretical issues seen with single schedules, a choice 
procedure with two alternatives can be used to determine changes in relative valuation 
and thus decision-making processes. As opposed to a single schedule, where only one 
reinforcer is presented at a time, concurrent schedules make use of two options, with 
distinct operandi, that have consequences that the respondent can freely allocate behavior 
across. The options can then be manipulated in terms of delay, probability, and 
magnitude, or even be used to compare drug and non-drug reinforcers. This type of 
procedure not only has methodological advantages over single schedules of 
reinforcement but also is more applicable to valuation and decision-making analyses in 
real life(see Banks et al., 2015 for review). 
The derivation of the switch from single to concurrent schedules can be visualized 
through the evolution of the mathematical models used to make quantitative, orderly, and 
theoretically-based predictions about choice behavior. The first model of decision-
making behavior began with the observation that response rates appeared to be under 
orderly control of the relative reward rates in variable-interval schedules. This 






                                                                   (3) 
 
B1 and B2 are response rates for option 1 and option 2, R1 and R2 are the 
reinforcement rates for the same options. Although the prediction that relative responding 
rates will match that of the relative reinforcement rates works well in a variety of 
conditions, it needed to be further altered due to pragmatic issues regarding rate of output 




not be linearly related to reward rate because organisms have a maximum motoric output 
for a given manipulandum, and thus the best fitting equation must allow for an asymptote 
in responding. Additionally, adjustments needed to be made to account for the fact that 
responding for the reward determined by the experimenter was not the only response 
available to the organism, and thus ‘leisure behavior’ in the case of single-schedule 
paradigms were included, leading to Herrnstein’s hyperbola (Herrnstein, 1970): 
                                  
 𝐵𝐵1
𝐵𝐵𝑒𝑒 … + 𝐵𝐵𝑁𝑁
= 𝑘𝑘
𝑅𝑅1
𝑅𝑅𝑒𝑒 … + 𝑅𝑅𝑁𝑁
                                                 (4) 
The rate of responding behavior for the two options (B1, BN) and that of responding 
for anything other than the scheduled commodity (Be) is now a function of its rate of 
reinforcement (R1) scaled by the organism’s maximal rate of responding for a given 
operant (k), divided by the rate of reinforcement for all other concurrently-available 
scheduled alternatives (RN) and all other non-scheduled alternatives (Re). Re was an 
attempt to control for non-scheduled reinforcing alternatives in single schedules, and  Be, 
extraneous behavior, was meant to account for some of the confounding motoric effects 
seen in single schedules. But these additions were not fully effective because the lack of 
experimental control makes Re difficult to evaluate and Be was not able to effectively 
differentiate the motoric effects from motivational effects (see Dallery & Soto, 2004 for 
review). However, in concurrent rather than single schedules the choice for each option 
must be viewed as relative to the choice for the other. Thus, allowing for increased 
control over the relative effects of choice between the alternatives making  Re and Be no 
longer necessary. Instead, deviations from the matching law (2) were accounted for by 
individual biases for one alternative or by a lack of sensitivity to relative reinforcer rates, 
leading to Baum’s generalized matching law (Baum, 1974): 
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Equation 4 is the first in a series of more modern matching equations called power 
functions (McDowell, 2005). Here, again, B1 and B2 are response rates for each 
alternative, and R1 and R2 are the reinforcement rates for the same options. s and b are 




respectively. Sensitivity refers to how well the subject is able to discriminate between the 
differences in the reinforcer dimension. This term maps the effects of the relative 
differences in reinforcer rate across alternatives onto differences in choice across them. 
“Greater” detection occurs if s is greater than 1, “lower” detection occurs if s is less than 
1, and perfect matching occurs when s is equal to 1. Bias refers to a subject’s 
predisposition for one option over another. A bias for the first option is seen if b is greater 
than 1, a bias against option 1 is seen if b is less than 1, and there is no bias when b is 
equal to 1. Finally, Baum created a logarithmic form of the generalized matching 
equation to make the output linear.  
                                         log �
𝐵𝐵1
𝐵𝐵2
� = 𝑠𝑠 log �
𝑅𝑅1
𝑅𝑅2
� + log 𝑏𝑏                                               (6)  
By adding the choices for each option and their relative reinforcement rates, a 
linear regression can be fit to the data such that s is the slope and b is the intercept.  
As mentioned earlier, the options can be manipulated on multiple reinforcer 
dimensions (i.e. magnitude, probability, delay, etc.) which can affect choice behavior 
(Rachlin & Baum, 1969; Rachlin, 1971). To account for the effects of multiple 
dimensions of reward on choice behavior, the relative rates of each dimension were 
concatenated as follows. 
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In Equation 6, the relative behavior (B) is a function of the relative rates of reward 
(R), magnitude (M), Immediacy (the inverse of delay; I), and other extraneous 
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Then each dimension was raised to its own sensitivity parameter where sR, M, I, …X 
represent the scaled sensitivity to changes in those dimensions. Again, a logarithmic form 
was created for linear analysis (8).  
The use of mathematical models to analyze behavioral output allows for testable 
predictions of changes in behavior in different scenarios. Since the equations predict 
responding, deviations from the expected outcomes can describe the sensitivity to 
changes in one or more dimensions of reward, and by extension changes in the decision-
making process. As Stout et al. (2004) put it, cognitive modeling can allow for the 
connection neuropsychology and behavior.  
1.5  Value-Based Decision-Making in CUD  
As only a relatively small fraction of total cocaine users transition from controlled 
drug use to developing disordered drug-taking (SAMHSA,2020), it is clear that it is not 
the effect of the drug itself that leads to addiction, but rather a combination of the hedonic 
effects of the drug combined with the drug-related changes in neurobiology and behavior 
that lead to CUD. Oftentimes these changes in behavior are seen as alterations in 
decision-making processes. For example, one of the diagnostic criteria for CUD is 
continued substance use despite harmful consequences (DSM-5). For example, pursuing 
and using addictive substances, such as cocaine, despite ill effects on health, 
employment, and relationships. If one chooses to use cocaine or pursue drug-related 
activities, they are necessarily foregoing other activities or rewards to which they could 
allocate their finite amounts of time and/or money. This shift in behavioral preferences to 
a state in which cocaine is chosen at the expense of other alternatives is indicative of the 
decision-making alterations seen in CUD and is thought to be an alteration in the relative 
value of the drug. In order to quantify and measure these changes in behavior, 




based decision-making. Therefore, modeling is an ideal tool to compare two opposing 
theories of drug addiction, habit theory and relative value theory. These theories both rely 
on the importance of DA, neuronal adaptation, and associative learning processes to 
explain the changes in the way the value of the drug is used to make decisions, but differ 
in how the valuation processes shift after the development of SUD.  
1.5.1  Habit Theory of Addiction 
In this theory the development of SUD is viewed as a transition from initial 
voluntary drug use, driven by the reinforcing effects of the drug, to loss of control over 
behavior, driven by compulsive, habitual actions (Koob & Le Moal, 1997, 2001, 2005; 
Lüscher, Robbins, Everitt, 2020). The actions are compulsive in the sense that the 
negative costs associated with the drug are discounted and do not deter the drug-seeking 
behavior (Hogarth, 2020) and habitual in the sense that the drug-seeking is not mediated 
by the value of the drug but instead by associations between the drug and the response 
due to training. Addictive drugs act as instrumental reinforcers, increasing the likelihood 
of the responses that produce them, which allows for self-administration procedures. It is 
thought that in these procedures, at first, the drug-seeking is goal-directed (i.e. a lever 
press to obtain the drug), but as training continues and the instrumental performance (i.e. 
lever press) is repeatedly paired with the stimuli associated with the administration of the 
drug, the stimulus-response (S-R) association increases and eventually dominates the 
behavioral output. This shift is thought to lead to habitual learning where the drug serves 
to strengthen the S-R association but is not the goal of the response. The instrumental 
response for the reinforcer is no longer goal-directed, but now automatic, whether that be 
through habitual or compulsive control. Therefore, devaluing the reinforcer does not 
affect the instrumental responding acquired by habit learning.  In the habit theory of 
addiction, the relative value of the drug reinforcer becomes superfluous as the actions are 
driven by habitual responding after chronic drug use.  
This changeover from voluntary to more habitual drug use is thought to represent a 
degradation in decision-making processes and a change of functioning in circuitries that 
mediate executive control. In humans with CUD, there is a loss of grey matter in regions 




(Ersche et al., 2013). These impairments are most often seen as impulsive decision-
making processes as it has been demonstrated that cocaine users exhibit deficits in tasks 
related to impulsivity. These include deficits in response inhibition in Go/No Go tasks 
(Verdejo-Garcia et al. 2007a), in processing reward and punishment contingencies in the 
Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) (Verdejo-Garcia et al. 2007b; Bechara at al. 2002; Kjome et 
al. 2010; Hulka et al., 2013) and a preference for smaller sooner rewards in Delayed 
Discounting tasks (Kirby & Petry, 2004; Heil et al. 2006; Bickel et al. 2011). Similar 
patterns of behavioral changes have also been seen in rodent models of CUD. Studies 
have found that animals that have undergone escalation procedures have shown not only 
the expected increased intake of the drug but also evidence of compulsivity shown via 
progressive ratio schedules (Paterson & Markou, 2003; Wee, Mandyam, Lekic & Koob, 
2008), increase drug-induced and stress-induced reinstatement of drug-seeking (Kippin et 
al 2006, Ferrario et al. 2005, Knackstedt et al. 2007 ), and persistent responding despite 
concomitant punishment (Vanderschuren & Everitt, 2004; Deroche-Gamonet el al., 2004; 
Pelloux, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2007). The deficits in these measures imply a change in 
the ability to properly evaluate and use value-based feedback to make decisions about the 
future. Instead, those with CUD are thought to make decisions that are impulsive and 
focused on gaining immediate rewards rather than choices that will allow them to obtain 
greater rewards or forgo future punishments. The impairment in executive control 
exacerbates the compulsive drug-seeking and taking; creating a cyclic effect with more 
years of abuse related to poorer decision-making (Bechara et al., 2001; Rogers et al., 
1999; Everitt & Robbins, 2015). Therefore, understanding the decision-making processes 
underlying drug preference is important to improve SUD treatments (Kalivas &Volkow, 
2005; Heyman 2013). 
The transition from voluntary to habitual is thought to occur not only in behavior 
but also in neurobiology. In the initial stages of cocaine use (recreational use) the 
stimulant increases DA release in the ventral striatum (Boileau et al. 2006).  But in 
habitual drug use, associated with CUD, the DA is released in response to drug-
associated cues in the putamen, part of the dorsal striatum (Wong, D. et al., 2006). The 
habit theory of addiction is centered around the process of overriding the circuitry that 




which is not sensitive to value. This transition is used to account for the continued use of 
the drug despite negative consequences, one of the behavioral hallmarks of SUD. 
1.5.2 Relative Value Theory of Addiction 
In contrast to habit theory, where the initial drug use is based on value and the 
secondary effects are explained through separate non-value-based processes that override 
or exploit the reward system, in the relative value theory of addiction both the initial drug 
use as well as the secondary effects are explained by changes in value. In relative value 
theory, the continued choice for drug alternatives is not accounted for by a disruption of 
the decision-making mechanisms but instead by a shift in the subjective value of the 
drug, such that now it is more valuable than other alternatives. Relative value theory 
originates from concepts found in behavioral economics which state that all choices are 
rational and based on the relative value of the alternatives to determine the likelihood that 
either option is chosen. While subjective value cannot be measured directly, it is revealed 
by choice procedures where the relative price of the drug as compared to other 
alternatives can be established. 
In human concurrent choice tasks, participants choose between a drug and a natural 
reinforcer. These studies have found that drug choice was significantly associated with 
dependence severity and drug use in experiments that used pictures (Hardy et al., 2018; 
Moeller et al., 2013) or actual consumption of the rewards (Stoops et al., 2012). 
Preferential drug choice was also associated with increased negative affective states, such 
as depression and anxiety (Hardy et al., 2018), which are known to be risk factors for 
dependence formation and relapse (Crum et al., 2013; Mathew et al., 2017; Samet et al., 
2013). Importantly, studies run to compare concurrent choice behavior between self-
administered cocaine and a species-specific non-drug alternative (money for humans, 
food for rhesus monkeys and rats) showed a similar pattern of cocaine choice across both 
human and non-human animals (Lile et al., 2016; Thomsen et al., 2013) such that 
increasing the dose of cocaine increased cocaine choice and vice versa; increasing the 
value of the alternative increased choice for the alternative. This shift in choices supports 
the idea that the concurrent choice task indexes the relative value of the drug and non-




magnitude of either alternative, it implies that the mechanisms for comparing or 
establishing the value of a reinforcer are not impaired in SUD. Thus, the continued choice 
of drug is not necessarily a byproduct of disrupted decision-making abilities but an 
increased preference for the drug caused by a shift in relative valuation.  
1.6 Introduction to the Current Experiment  
As mentioned above, changes in value-based decision-making are thought to 
underlie the behavior patterns seen in SUD but there are various types of tasks that study 
decision-making, ranging from simple delay discounting to more intricate gambling 
tasks. Each of these tasks is an example of a concurrent schedule but they differ in their 
complexity and in the different reinforcer dimensions they seek to manipulate in order to 
examine relative valuation processes. The task chosen for this experiment is a concurrent 
choice task that measures decision-making between two isomorphic food options with 
varying probabilities of reward. In this way, it is more lifelike than traditional two-option 
choice tasks with fixed outcome probabilities. The different probability blocks are not 
signaled, so the animal must constantly re-evaluate the options to determine which one 
has the higher probability of delivering reward at a given time. Therefore, although the 
animals employ the same general tactics every day, their individual choices must remain 
sensitive to the changes in relative value across choice options.   
 The goal of the present study was to investigate, directly, changes in decision-
making over the course of escalation of cocaine intake. Specifically, this study aims to 
compare rats with assumed regulated and dysregulated intake at timepoints throughout 
the escalation procedure and thus to compare any changes in behavior based on the 
predictions of habit theory and relative value theory to determine which is more 
appropriate for describing CUD. To compare these two theories, a concurrent choice task 
was run in tandem with an escalation procedure, which was used as a rodent model for 
developing CUD-like behavior. After the escalation procedure, the rats that underwent 
longer access to cocaine (6hr) should exhibit the characteristic increase of cocaine intake 
over time that is associated with the assumed dysregulation of intake, whereas the rats 




to account for the effects of the drug in the brain without the accompanying behavioral 
changes. In terms of alterations in behavioral output after escalation, habit theory would 
predict that the increased drug intake in the longer access animals would be accompanied 
by a shift in the behavior from goal-directed to habitual, which would account for the 
increased intake over time; further, it would predict that the shift would also lead to a 
disruption in decision-making abilities. Conversely, if there is not a change in decision-
making after escalation of intake, this would correspond with the predictions of relative-
value theory in which decision-making abilities remains intact and shifts in the relative-
values of the options explains alterations in choice behavior. However, in this present 
experiment we are not able to assess any shifts in relative-value the cocaine as compared 
to food so further studies are  needed to test the cocaine-food relative value shifts 
predicted by relative-value theory. To compare decision-making over time, the rat’s 
behavior was compared at a baseline, throughout the 21-day escalation period, during a 
return to 1-hr access for all animals, and during a forced abstinence period. This week-
by-week analysis will allow for the detection of changes in decision-making via escalated 
intake and determine if those changes, if any, are long-lasting. 
 
CHAPTER 2. METHODS 
2.1 Subjects  
Fifteen male and sixteen female Sprague-Dawley Rats (Harlan Inc.; Indianapolis, 
IN, USA), weighing approximately 250-275 g on arrival were used. Rats were 
individually housed (12:12hr light:dark cycle) with ad libitum access to food and water in 
their home cage. During food restriction rats were maintained at approximately 85% of 
their free-feeding body weights. All experiments were conducted during the light phase. 
All experiments were conducted according to the 2010 NIH Guide for the Care and Use 
of Laboratory Animals (8th Edition) and were approved by the Institutional Animal Care 




2.2 Apparatus  
Experiments were conducted in operant chambers (ENV-008, MED Associates, St. 
Albans, VT) enclosed within sound-attenuating compartments (ENV-018M). Each 
chamber was connected to a personal computer (SG-502), and all chambers were 
operated using MED-PC. Within each chamber, a recessed food receptacle (ENV- 
200R2MA) outfitted with a head-entry detector (ENV (ENV-254-CB) was located on the 
front response panel of the chamber, two retractable response levers were mounted on 
either side of the food receptacle (ENV-122CM), and a white cue-light (ENV-221M) was 
mounted above each response lever. The back-response panel was outfitted with two 
nosepoke response receptacles (ENV-114BM) directly opposite to front response levers, 
a house-light (ENV-227M) was located at the top of the back panel between the two 
nosepoke response receptacles with Sonalert© tones (ENV-223 AM and ENV223- 
HAM) located on either side of the house-light. Food pellets (45-mg Bio-Serv Precision 
Pellets; Flemington, NJ) were delivered via a dispenser (ENV-203M-45). Drug infusions 
were delivered via a syringe pump (PHM-100) through tubing strung through a leash 
(PHM-120) that attached to a swivel (PHM-115) above the chamber.  
2.3 Drugs 
Cocaine hydrochloride, gifted from the National Institute of Drug Abuse (Bethesda, 
MD, USA), was mixed with sterile saline (0.9% NaCl).  
2.4 Initial Training 
2.4.1 Magazine Shaping 
Rats were first trained to retrieve food pellets from the food receptacle for four 
consecutive days. Rats were placed in the operant chambers and given 25 minutes to 




2.4.2 Orienting Response 
Next, an orienting response was added. The start of each trial was now signaled by 
the illumination of the house-light. A contingent response, head-entry into the magazine, 
would result in the offset of the house-light and illumination of either the left or right 
nosepoke port. Breaking the beam in the illuminated port resulted in the delivery of a 
food pellet in the magazine. Each session consisted of 30 trials, 15 left- and 15 right-
nosepoke port illuminations. Ports were illuminated individually and pseudo-randomly, 
where no more than 6 presentations of the same port would occur in a row. Trials were 
separated by a 10-s ITI. Rats were trained on this response chain for four days. 
2.5 Concurrent Choice Task  
Rats were then trained on the decision-making task. The start of the trial was 
signaled by the illumination of the house-light, as in training. A head-entry into the 
magazine resulted in the offset of the house-light and the illumination of both the left and 
right nosepoke ports. Rats selected either the left or right port by breaking the beam. 
Once a selection was made, both ports went dark and the reward was delivered or not. On 
rewarded trials a pellet was dispensed into the magazine, the magazine light was 
illuminated, and a tone was played for 5-s. On non-rewarded trials, there was a time out 
for 5-s. Trials were separated by a 5-s ITI regardless of reward status.  
The reward was set up on either the left or right nosepoke port based on 4 
probability blocks. The ratio of reward for the blocks were 6:1 (6), 2:1 (2), 1:2 (0.5), and 
1:6(0.167). The block order was pseudo-randomly shuffled each session. For example, if 
the first block was 1:6 then the second block could be either 2:1 or 1:2. Each block 
consisted of 30 trials, for a total of 120 trials per session. Blocks were separated by a 2-
minute blackout period. Rats were trained on this task until stable, about 30 days. 
2.6 Lever-Training  
To pretrain responding on the levers before surgery, rats were trained to lever press 




following each press on the active lever (counterbalanced for each side of the 
experimental chamber). The opposite, inactive, lever was not presented at this time. Each 
session consisted of 50 trials or an hour whichever came first. Training consisted of five 
consecutive 1-h sessions for five days preceding surgery.  
2.7 Catheter Surgery and Maintenance  
Rats then underwent surgery for implantation of a chronic indwelling jugular 
catheter. Rats were first anesthetized with a ketamine (Schein, Dublin, OH)/xylazine 
(Akorn, Inc., Decatur, IL)/acepromazine (Boehringer Ingelheim, St. Joseph, MO; 
75/7.5/0.75 mg/kg) mixture at 0.15 ml/100 g body weight (i.p.). The female rats were 
anesthetized with a mixture that excluded acepromazine. Catheters were inserted into the 
jugular vein, extended under the skin, and exited the body through an incision on the 
scalp. A cannula was attached to the end of the catheter and secured to the skull using 
dental acrylic and four jeweler screws. Animals were given a week to recover after 
surgery. After each self-administration session, catheters were with 0.2ml of a 
gentamicin-heparin-saline solution to prevent infection and preserve patency. Catheter 
patency was checked periodically and at the end of the self-administration portion of the 
experiment by muscle tone loss following 0.2ml remifentanil administration.  
2.8 Cocaine Self-Administration and Escalation 
Methods were similar to those published previously (Ahmed & Koob, 1998) with 
minor changes. Following recovery, all rats were trained to self-administer cocaine on an 
FR-1 using the same active/inactive lever assignment from food training. Presses on the 
active lever resulted in an infusion of cocaine, retraction of both levers, and the 
illumination of the cue light above the active lever for 5.9-s. After 5.9-s both levers were 
presented and the next trial began. Presses on the inactive lever had no consequence. 
Acquisition of cocaine self-administration using a dose of 1 mg/kg/infusion was 
continued for 7 days and then the dose was reduced to 0.3 mg/kg/infusion for another 7 
days of acquisition.  The remainder of the self-administration sessions used a 0.3 




Animals were then assigned one of two groups. Animals assigned to the short-
access group (n=16; 7 males and 9 females) continued to self-administer cocaine under 
the 1-hr access conditions from acquisition for an additional 21 days. Animals assigned to 
the long access group (n=15; 8 males and 7 females) were switched to the 6-hr access for 
21 days. After this 21-day period all animals returned to the 1-hr access for an additional 
7 days. 
2.9 Daily/Overall Timeline   
Each day the concurrent choice task was run in the morning. Once the rats had 
completed the task they were returned to their home cages for 1 hour before they were 
run in the self-administration sessions. Rats were run in different boxes for the concurrent 
choice and self-administration tasks to reduce the context effects. The periods of the 
experiment for analysis were 1-week averages as follows: “Baseline”-before catheter 
surgery, “Acquisition”- 0.3mg/kg/infusion training, “Escalation”- 21 days at either 1hr or 
6hr, “Return to 1hr”- all rats returned to 1hr access, and “Forced Abstinence”- concurrent 
choice task alone with no self-administration in the afternoon.  
 
CHAPTER 3. ANALYSIS 
3.1 Self-Administration  
For each period of the self-administration procedure; Acquisition, Escalation, and 
Return to 1hr, model-comparisons predicting the number of infusions of 0.3mg/kg of 
cocaine were fit to determine the best model using the following taxonomy: Model A 
included Subject nested within Access(1hr or 6hr) as predictors of both the intercept and 
the slope. The continuous timepoint variable Day was centered to make model 
coefficients more interpretable (Algina & Swaminathan, 2011; Enders & Tofighi, 2007). 
Model B was the same but included Subject nested within both Access and Sex the 
interaction between Sex and Access as predictors of the intercept and slope. Models were 




values between models) and the accompanying evidence ratios (Burnham, 2002; 
Burnham, 2011); evidence ratios indicate goodness-of-fit of the best model relative to the 
second-best model. Only statistics from models with the highest evidence ratios were 
reported.      
3.2  Concurrent Choice Task 
Choice behavior was calculated as a seven-day average ratio of choices for Option 
A as a function of Option A’s relative reward rates. To create a linear relationship, the 
raw ratios and probability blocks (6, 2, 0.5, 0.167) were log transformed. Molar data was 
analyzed using the Generalized Matching equation (described above; (4 & 5)). As 
mentioned above, the bias term (intercept) captures preferences for the left or right 
irrespective of relative reward rates between the two options. Lower values of b reflect a 
greater bias for the right, and values closer to 1 (or 0 when logged) reflect no bias. The 
constant s (slope) captures individuals’ sensitivities to changes in the relative reward rates 
between the two options. Perfect matching between behavior and rates would create an s 
value of 1.  
Hierarchical linear models predicting Log Choice for Option A were fit according 
to the following taxonomy: Model A included Subject as a random factor nested within 
Access (1hr or 6hr) as well Condition (dummy coded week by week; Before Surgery(1), 
After Surgery(2), Acquisition(3), Weeks 1-3 of Escalation(4-6), Return to 1hr access(7), 
and Forced Abstinence(8)) as predictors of both the intercept and the slope. The 
continuous variable Log Raw Ratio (the logged values of the probability blocks) was 
centered to make model coefficients more interpretable. Model B was the same but also 
included Sex and the interaction between Sex and Access. As before models were 
compared using ΔAIC and only statistics from models with the highest evidence ratios 
were reported.   
To compare the performance of steady state behavior, hierarchical linear models 
predicting Log Choice for Option A during the Escalation period were fit according to the 
following taxonomy: Model A included Subject as a random factor nested within Access 




Raw Ratio (the logged values of the probability blocks) was centered to make model 
coefficients more interpretable. Model B was the same but Log Choice for Option A was 
now calculated as the averages of the last 10 trials of each block (rather than all 30 trials 
in Model A). As before models were compare using ΔAIC. 
Finally, to check the form of the model, we compared the linear model described 
above to that of a cubic model and compared using ΔAIC. 
 
3.3 Preference Reversal    
To illustrate the changes choice for option A before and after a shift from a low to a 
high probability block (i.e. a preference reversal), choice behavior was calculated on a 
trial-by-trial basis and reported as Percent Choice for Option A. In preference reversals, 
the animal first encountered a block that favored Option B (i.e. 1:2; 1:6) then switched to 
a block that favored Option A (i.e. 2:1; 6:1). Percent Choice for Option A is a group 
average of the percent choices for Option A of each of the final 5 trials of the block that 
favors Option B and each of the 30 trials after the switch to the block that favors Option 
A. The trials are averaged over the 21 days of the escalation period.  
Hierarchical linear models predicting Percent Choice for Option A were fit 
according to the following taxonomy: Model A included Subject as a random factor, 
nested within Access (6hr or 1hr) as predictors of both the intercept and the slope. The 
continuous variable Trial was centered to make model coefficients more interpretable. 
Model B was the same but also included Sex and the interaction between Sex and Access.  
3.3.1 Preference Reversal: Endpoints 
Additionally, the endpoints of the preference reversals were compared. Endpoints 
were calculated as averages of the choices for Option A during the last 5 trials of both the 
low (1:6 or 1:2) and high block (6:1 or 2:1 respectively). 
Hierarchical linear models predicting Percent Choice for Option A were also fit to 




a random factor, nested within Access (6hr or 1hr),  and Magnitude of the reversal (1:6 to 
6:1; large switch or 1:2 to 2:1; small switch) as predictors of both the intercept and the 
slope. The continuous variable Block was centered to make model coefficients more 
interpretable. Model B was the same but also included Sex and the interaction between 
Sex and Access. As before models were compared using ΔAIC and only statistics from 
models with the highest evidence ratios were reported.   
 
CHAPTER 4. RESULTS  
4.1 Cocaine Self-Administration 
Figure 1 shows the self-administration infusions of 0.3mg/kg cocaine throughout 
the Acquisition, Escalation, and Return to 1hr access periods. Overall, both groups had 
low, stable responding during the acquisition period. Then during the escalation period, 
the 6-hr access group showed an escalation in drug-taking that increased over time 
whereas the 1-hr access group’s responses remained low and stable. Finally, when 6-hr 
access rats were returned to the 1-hr access condition their responses became similar to 
those of the 1-hr access group. To quantify these changes in self-administration behavior 
over each time period, multilevel models were fit to the data.  
4.1.1 Acquisition 
In the acquisition period, Model A (Access only) was used for analysis as the 
evidence ratio was 330876.34, showing strong support for Model A over Model B. The 
model revealed no main effects of Access on cocaine intake but a significant main effect 
of Day [F1,29.31 = 8.32, p = 0.0073] with an increase of 1.51 infusion per day. The average 
centered intercept was estimated to be 15.82 infusions of cocaine, which is significantly 
different from 0 (p = <0.0001). In summary, there were no differences between the 
groups during the acquisition period and both groups self-administered a significant 





In the escalation period, Model B (Sex and Access) was used as the evidence ratio 
was 223.18, showing strong support for Model B over Model A. The model revealed no 
main effects of Sex, but a main effect of Access [F1,27 = 33.72, p < 0.001], where the 
intercept for the 6hr access group was significantly higher than that of the 1hr access 
group (79.53 and 14.91 infusions, respectively). There was also a main effect of Day 
[F1,27.04 = 5.36, p = 0.0284] and also an interaction between Access and Day [F1,27.04 = 
4.32, p = 0.047] such that the estimate for the slope for the 6hr access group at the center 
of the escalation period increased significantly from 0 by 1.86 infusions per day, whereas 
the 1hr access group increased by 0.19 infusions per day. In summary, the 6hr access rats 
took more infusions and increased their taking at a faster rate than 1hr access rats over the 
escalation period.  
4.1.3 Return to 1hr 
In the Return to 1hr period, when all animals had 1hr access to cocaine, Model A 
(Access only) was chosen for parsimony because the evidence ratio was 1.33, showing 
weak support for Model B over Model A. The model found no main effects of Access or 
Day. The intercept was estimated to be 38.29, which was significantly different from 0 [p 
<.0001]. The average slope was estimated to be 0.72, which was not significantly 
different from 0 [p = 0.34]. In summary, there were no differences between the groups 





Figure 1: Cocaine Self-Administration 
A) Mean (∓ SEM) infusions of 0.3mg/kg cocaine over acquisition (days 1-7), 
escalation period (days 8-28), and return to 1hr access (days 29-35) for both the 6hr and 
1hr access rats. B) Mean (∓ SEM) infusions of 0.3mg/kg cocaine over the 21-day 




4.2  Concurrent Choice  
Figure 2 shows the Log Raw Ratio choices for Option A as a function of the log of 
Option A’s relative reward rates. Overall, both groups tended to prefer the option 
providing the greater reward odds (or the “richer” option), with preferences being 
stronger the more disparate the relative rates. The model chosen for analysis was Model 
A (Access only) as the evidence ratio was 2.6 e16 , indicating large support for Model A 
over Model B. This model revealed a main effect of Log Raw Ratio (slope) [F1,29 = 
874.89, p <.0001], such that both groups have a positive slope of 0.33. Additionally, there 
was an effect of the interaction between Log Probability and Condition [F1,29  = 11.44, p 
= 0.0021] such that the slope positively increased with each subsequent week. In 
summary, both groups were sensitive to the relative probabilities of Option A, as seen by 
the slope, and improved their decision-making over time as seen by the interaction 
between Log Probability and Condition. There were no differences in decision-making 
due to Sex or Access.  
The model chosen for the comparison of steady state during the Escalation period 
was Model A (all 30 trials) as the evidence ratio was 4.7 e43, indicating large support for 
Model A over Model B. This model revealed a main effect of Log Raw Ratio (slope) 
[F1,29 = 415.00 , p <.0001], such that both groups have a positive slope of 0.36. There was 
no main effect of Access. This model can be seen in Figure 2C. The support for Model A 
over Model B indicates that it is acceptable to include all 30 trials in the analysis of 
choice behavior rather than only the last 10 trials where the behavior is fully established. 
The comparison of model form favored the cubic function with an evidence ratio of 
1442.75, indicating support for the cubic model over that of the linear model. However, 
even though the AIC comparison favors the cubic model, the model comparison with 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) was inconclusive. BIC penalizes model complexity 
more heavily than AIC and is therefore more likely to choose the more parsimonious 
model. When fitting models that are based on quantitative models of behavior it is also 
important to consider the theoretical implications of the form of the model. The current 
steps between the relative reward ratios are uneven. For example, a switch from 6:1 to 




impression of a non-linear relationship, which appears to have been picked up by the 
cubic form of the model. Because this cubic relation can be explained by the sampling 
size of the relative reward rats and the two likelihood criterion disagree, the linear model 









Figure 2: Concurrent Choice Task Macro Averages 
A) Mean (∓ SEM) log raw ratio for choice for Option A over Option B as a 
function of Option A’s log relative reward rate( 1:6 as -0.77, 1:2 as -0.33, 2:1 as 0.33, 6:1 
as 0.77) for 1-hr rats over 4 7-day averages (Baseline, Week three of the escalation 
period, Return to 1hr access, and Forced abstinence).  B) Mean (∓ SEM) log raw ratio for 
choice as a function of Option A’s log relative reward rate for 6-hr rats over 4 7-day 
averages.  C) Mean (∓ SEM) log raw ratio choice a function of Option A’s log relative 




4.3  Preference Reversal   
Both 1hr and 6hr groups showed similar sensitivity to the change in relative reward 
rates for both 1:2 to 2:1 reversal and the 1:6 to 6:1 reversal (Figure 3). When the 
magnitude of the switch was large (1:6 to 6:1), the choice behavior tended to more 
rapidly increase for Option A compared to smaller magnitude switch (1:2 to 2:1) 
For the preference reversal from the 1:6 to 6:1 block (Figure 3A), Model A (Access 
only) was chosen as the evidence ratio was over 11 billion, indicating strong support for 
Model A over Model B. This model revealed a main effect of Access [F1,29 =7.99, p= 
0.0084] such that the intercept for the 6hr animals was estimated to be 40.4 percent 
choice for option A and the intercept for 1hr animals was estimated to be 43.3 percent 
choice for Option A at trial 25. There was also a main effect of the centered continuous 
variable Trial [F F1,29 =154.19, p<0.0001] such that the percent choice significantly 
increased over trials. But no interaction between access and day indicating that both 
groups similarly adjusted to the reversal of the optimal option.  
For the preference reversal from 1:2 to the 2:1 block (Figure 3B), Model A (Access 
only) was chosen as the evidence ratio was over 3 billion, indicating support for Model A 
over Model B. This model revealed a main effect of Access [F1,29 = 4.21, p= 0.049] such 
that the intercept for the 6hr animals was estimated to be 49.5 percent choice for option A 
and the intercept for 1hr animals was estimated to be 51.5% at trial 25. There was also a 
main effect of the centered continuous variable, Trial [F1,29 =23.90, p<0.0001] such that 
the slope increased significantly over trials. But no interaction between access and day 





Figure 3: Preference Reversal  
A,B) Percent choice of Option A (∓ SEM) during adjoining blocks in which the 
relative rate of reinforcement transitioned from low to high. The larger magnitude switch 
(1:6 to 6:1) is shown in A, and the smaller, (1:2 to 2:1) in B. Data to the left of the 
vertical line are the last 5 trials in the block in which the relative reinforcement rates 
favored Option B - 1:6 (A) and 1:2 (B). Data to the right of the vertical line are the next 
30 trials for the block which the relative reinforcement rates favored Option A- 6:1 
(A)and 2:1 (B). The lighter solid line represents the 1hr-access rats and the dark dashed 




4.3.1 Preference Reversal: Endpoints 
Both 1hr and 6hr groups showed similar sensitivity to the change in relative reward 
rates for both large and small magnitude reversals (Figure4). As above, the larger 
magnitude reversal showed more rapid increases in the choices for Option A than the 
smaller reversal. There appears to be a difference in intercept, but not slopes seen 
between the groups. Indicating that although the groups may have had different starting 
points before the reversal, they adjusted similarly to the change in optimal option. 
For the comparison of the endpoints for the two preference reversals (Figure 4), 
Model A (Access only) was chosen as the evidence ratio was 6.3e16, indicating support 
for Model A over Model B. This model revealed a main effect of Access [F1,13.35  = 9.38, 
p= 0.0088] such that the pooled intercept for the 1hr access group was 22.3 percent 
choice for Option A and the 6hr access group was 19.4 percent choice for Option A. 
There was also a main effect of the centered continuous variable, Block, [F1,34.68  = 
139.48, p<.001] such that there was a positive slope from the transition from the low to 
the high probability block. Additionally, there was an interaction between the Magnitude 
of the reversal (1:6 to 6:1; large switch or 1:2 to 2:1; smaller switch) and the Block 
[F1,34.68  = 49.87, p= p<.001] such that the slope of the preference reversal was steeper for 
the large magnitude switch than the smaller magnitude switch. There was no interaction 
between Access and Block, therefore both groups similarly adjusted to the reversal of the 






Figure 4: Preference Reversal: Endpoints 
 Percent choice of Option A (∓ SEM) averaged for the last 5 trials of the two 
adjoining blocks. Block 1 in which the relative reinforcement rate favors Option B and 
Block 2 which favors Option A. The circles represent the larger reversal, 1:6 to 6:1, and 
the squares represent the smaller reversal, 1:2 to 2:1. The open, gray symbols represent 




CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
5.1  Discussion 
The discussion of SUDs in the preclinical literature is largely centered around the 
brain disease model of addiction. In this model, SUD is considered a chronic relapsing 
disease, in which there are repeated cycles of binge/intoxication, withdrawal/negative 
affect, and preoccupation/craving. These cycles are accompanied by neurobiological 
changes in the mesocorticolimbic system related to drug usage that are thought to change 
the propensity of an individual to make subsequent choices for drugs (Koob & Volkow, 
2016; Volkow, Koob, & McLellan, 2016). The correlation between neural and behavioral 
changes after chronic drug administration has led to theories centered around insensitivity 
to consequences and devaluation of rewards. Additionally, many of the theories posit that 
these insensitivities are linked to aberrant and maladaptive habit-based learning (Robbins 
& Everitt, 1999). For example, habit theory posits that initial drug-taking is driven by the 
rewarding effects of the drug, but after repeated use, the hedonic effects diminish as 
tolerance mechanisms increase the dosage required to obtain the rewarding effects of the 
drug and avoid withdrawal. In turn, these alterations are thought to lead to suboptimal or 
disordered decision-making, in which a person with SUD will choose the drug over other 
alternatives. Given the chronic nature of SUD in the disease model of addiction alongside 
the proposed impairments in decision-making mechanisms, this theory predicts that 
global decision-making would be altered after chronic substance use and that these 
impairments would be long-lasting. 
The brain disease model of addiction is largely supported by animal models using 
single schedules of reward. But given the theoretical problems that rate-dependent 
models face (as discussed above), it is improper to use these schedules to determine the 
real-world implications of the effects of drugs on decision-making. To correct this 
inaccuracy and to compare two theories of addiction, this study measured decision-
making over the course of chronic cocaine self-administration. The escalation of drug 




concurrent choice task as well as a behavioral economic framework for analysis. The 
present experiment has shown that despite drastic differences in escalated cocaine intake, 
there were no differences in decision-making between the two groups. Choice behavior 
was viewed in light of Herrnstein’s (1970) matching law (3), emphasizing that over time 
the relative rate of choice for a particular option will approximate the rate of reward for 
that option. Models using the generalized matching equation (Baum, 1974; Rachlin, 
1971; (4 & 5) provided good descriptions of molar data for the choice task, indicating 
that the animals showed sensitivity to relative reward rates and allocated their decisions 
appropriately, similar to monkeys (Lau & Glimcher, 2005) and humans (Rutledge et al., 
2009). Both the longer (6-hr) and shorter (1-hr) access rats favored Option A when the 
relative reward rates also favored Option A and gradually shifted their preferences to 
Option B when relative reward rates also switched, as seen in the analysis of preference 
reversal, indicating that despite the “disordered” intake after cocaine escalation, the rats 
showed no change in sensitivity to the reward ratios. Similar results have been found in 
laboratory decision-making procedures with substance-using populations who have 
shown sensitivity to relative reward magnitude, price, and delay (Moeller & Stoops, 
2015; Jones & Comer, 2013; Griffiths, Rush, & Puhala, 1996). The sustained sensitivity 
to these manipulations implies that value-based decision-making remains intact in both 
rodent models and those with SUD. The retention of sensitivity to value manipulations is 
inconsistent with the predictions of habit theory, which posits that after chronic cocaine 
use the decision-making mechanisms used to evaluate the relative values of two 
alternatives become somehow impaired. Yet, since we see no changes in task 
performance, another theory might be considered to explain the changes in behavior seen 
in CUD.  
There are several reviews urging the addiction research field to broaden its 
understanding of SUD and look beyond the brain disease model of addiction, arguing that 
it has not been as well-supported or as effective in creating new treatments as many had 
hoped (Hall, Carter, & Forlini, 2015; Kalant, 2010). As an alternate theory, a growing 
literature is accounting for addiction by using value-based mechanisms. From a 
behavioral economic viewpoint, the development of addiction is a reinforcement 




discounting of rewards (Bickel et al., 1999; Madden et al., 1999; Myerson & Green, 
1995). Discounting is a decrease in the value of a given reward that is proportional to the 
delay (i.e. initially a steep decline in the value when the delay is short, then the decreases 
in value become shallower as the delay increases; Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). Hyperbolic 
discounting can also be described by the common phrase “smaller, sooner and larger, 
later”, describing the scenario in which a subject chooses a smaller reward that is 
delivered in a short time rather than a larger reward delivered at a delay. Delay 
discounting procedures that alter the magnitude and delay of rewards have often been 
linked with the construct of impulsivity, which has then been associated with the habit 
theory of addiction. However, studies that focus only on the change in relative value and 
not additional behavioral constructs show greater support for relative value theories. For 
example, one study found that SUD symptom severity is associated with greater relative 
value of the drug to a food alternative, but not greater discounting of opportunity or delay 
costs associated with the drug (Hogarth & Hardy, 2018). Other behavioral economic 
review papers have concluded that results from both demand and discounting procedures 
indicate an increase in the relative value of the drug after continued use (Bickel et al. 
2014; MacKillop 2016).  
In addition to the increased value of the drug, there is evidence to suggest that those 
with SUD show inhibited responses and attention towards non-drug reinforcers (Lubman 
et al., 2009). Similarly, increased drug-taking behavior was associated with diminished 
engagement in alternative, future-oriented activities (Meshesha et al., 2018). Both of 
these studies hint at a reduction in responses to non-drug rewards after chronic substance 
use. If so, not only is there an increase in the relative value of the drug after the 
development of SUD, but also perhaps a simultaneous decrease in the relative value of 
the non-drug alternatives. If indeed there is a shift in relative values such that the drug 
increase as alternatives decrease, this proposed distortion explains how there could be a 
continued choice for drug, yet the mechanisms for making value-based decisions could 
remain intact and functional. In this scenario, when faced with a choice between a drug 
and non-drug reward, hyperbolic discounting increases the relative value of the drug 
leading to its immediate use (Bickel et al., 2014). If discounting occurs and the relative 




for drugs can be explained not as a disruption in decision-making mechanisms, but as a 
product of a shift in the relative-value scale. This discounting behavior can also be 
viewed in light of the principles of Baum’s generalized matching law (4) by using time-
allocation instead of behavior as shown in Rachlin (2006). 








                                                           (10) 
 Given two activities to which time is allocated (T1 and T2), the proportion of time 
allocated to one of them equals the proportion of obtained reinforcers on that option. The 
proportions are then scaled by sensitivity, s, and bias, b, as before. Equation 9 implies 
that the time allocated to each activity is discounted by reinforcement contingent on the 
other activity. When viewed in this way, the hyperbolic discounting that leads to the use 
of drugs can be said to follow the stipulations of matching in that the option with the 
higher relative value (drug) is chosen more often. Based on this definition, decision-
making abilities remain intact despite the choice for a reward that may have negative 
consequences in the future. In other words, the individual choices for drugs are 
maximizing local utility (i.e. at the present moment or trial-by-trial; Herrnstein & Prelec, 
1992; Heyman, 2013; Rachlin, 1997) by choosing the more valuable option on each trial 
even though in the long run, these choices seem as if the decisions are controlled by habit 
or compulsion.  
Given the lack of behavioral differences seen in longer and shorter access animals 
in this study, it seems that decision-making as a whole was not disrupted by chronic 
cocaine self-administration, suggesting that habit learning may not be the underlying 
cause of addiction. Instead, the data support relative value theories that posit that chronic 
exposure to the drug leads to a differential weighting of drug as compared to non-drug 
reinforcers. The transition from viewing SUD through the lens of habit theory to that of 
relative value theory is also supported by meta-analysis performed by Hogarth & Field 
(2020). They found that in human studies of SUD, dependence severity was not 
associated with insensitivity to the devaluation of the drug, contradicting the expectations 
of habit theory. In contrast, they found support for behavioral-economic-based theories 




theory vulnerability to drug dependence is driven by individuals attributing greater value 
to drug rewards, which can be exacerbated by negative affective states such as stress or 
sadness, in which users report using drugs as a coping mechanism. These findings 
suggest that instead of an impairment in valuation processes or habitual S-R 
relationships, the drug-seeking/taking behavior remains goal-directed even after chronic 
exposure.  
5.2 Limitations  
Although there was no change in global decision making, as measured by the molar 
averages of concurrent choice task behavior, there were significant differences found 
between the 1-hr and 6-hr access groups in the analysis of the preference reversal. One 
possible explanation for the differences between the access groups in the preference 
reversal analysis but not the molar choice analysis is that there were slight differences in 
the biases of the groups during the escalation period in which the analysis occurs (seen 
but not significantly different in the intercepts of figure 2C). Due to limitations in the 
number of animals that could be run at one time, groups were run at different time points 
and therefore could have had different biases from initial training. However, since the 
shifts in slopes are parallel between the two groups, they responded similarly to changes 
in valuation despite differences in individual biases which is the main outcome of the 
manipulation. In the future, groups will be counterbalanced and run concurrently to avoid 
group bias differences. Additionally, perhaps with a larger sample size for each group, it 
would be possible to negate those biases.  
It is important to note that there have been contradictions in studies investigating 
changes in decision-making following chronic cocaine self-administration.  For example, 
one study found deleterious changes in decision-making after cocaine exposure in the rat 
Gambling Task (rGT) (Cocker et al., 2019). However, the Iowa Gambling Task 
(IGT)(Bechara et al., 1994), and thus it’s rodent counterpart, rGT, are known to have 
high inter-study and inter-individual variability (Steingroever et al., 2013; see Bull, 
Tippet, & Addis, 2015 for further review). This inconsistency may be due to the use of a 




(Areais et al., 2013) and the rGT (Visser et al., 2011). Additionally, as mentioned in a 
review of IGT, typically all 100 trials are included in the analysis instead of reaching a 
predefined criterion of performance before beginning the analysis. The inclusion of all 
trials means that healthy individuals with a slower learning rate are not flagged as a false-
positive for impairments. (Bull, Tippett, & Addis, 2015). Therefore, it is possible that if 
the rats did not reach a stable baseline for behavior, the deleterious effects are sample 
variability in the task rather than negative effects of the drug exposure. In the current 
choice study, rats reached a stable baseline before the drug was introduced to avoid 
differences in learning rate and focus only on changes in decision-making relevant to the 
onset of drug self-administration.   
5.3 Further Studies  
More studies are needed to investigate manipulations of the various reinforcer 
dimensions of drug and non-drug reinforcers in CUD to determine the interplay between 
different rewards, the environment, and choice behavior. The inclusion of the effect of 
environment, specifically through the use of concurrent choice tasks, is crucial to the 
study of relative value as value is defined by the decision-making context in which the 
reinforcer is made available (Hursh & Roma, 2016). For example, procedures that 
‘devalue’ the drug reward through satiation or increase the choice for the non-drug 
reward after inducing a rodent model of CUD would allow us to examine how the 
relative value of both rewards shift over time. Relative value theories would predict that 
after chronic use the relative value between alternatives would be shifted toward the drug 
such that manipulations that favor the drug option would lead to increased drug choice, 
whereas those that favor the alternative could either decrease the drug choice or increase 
the choice for the alternative. The sensitivity to these changes could determine how 
drastically and how long-lasting the shift in relative value for the drug is; important 
factors for a clearer understanding of how relative value shifts associated with CUD 
affect behavior.  
Another area of interest is the simulation of opportunity costs, such that increased 




follows the anecdotal experience of humans with CUD, as their drug-use becomes more 
severe they begin to lose out on opportunities to engage with other alternatives, such as a 
job, interactions with loved ones, or other resources. By simulating the decrease in 
available rewards, it is possible to investigate how the relative value of drugs changes 
with reductions in access to alternative activities/reinforcers. In animal models, 
differences in the environment has been simulated by environmental enrichment studies 
in which one group of animals is reared in a novel social environment (enriched 
condition, EC) and another is reared in isolation (isolated condition, IC; Bardo, 
Neiswander, & Kelly 2013; Simpson & Kelly, 2011). The condition of the IC rats is 
likened to that of the human experience of CUD since they have few alternative rewards 
to engage in their daily life. For the rats, one of the few rewards available to them is the 
drug during their self-administration sessions. This difference in environment between 
the EC and IC rats is associated with changes in drug-taking such that EC rats show 
decreased self-administration of cocaine compared to their isolated counterparts (Puhl et 
al. 2012). EC rats also show increased demand elasticity (𝛼𝛼; (1)) for both stimulants and 
non-drug reinforcers as compared to IC rats. Yet when the IC rats are switched to the 
enriched environment their 𝛼𝛼 levels become similar to that of the EC rats (Yates, Bardo, 
& Beckmann, 2017). The restoration of 𝛼𝛼 levels by adjusting the environment may 
indicate that the novel environment and social interaction given in the enriched condition 
increases the number of reward alternatives available in the home cage and thus 
decreases the demand for reinforcers outside of the home cage (i.e. drug). If so, the 
availability of other non-drug alternatives may account for the decrease in self-
administration and the increased elasticity seen after the IC rats experience environmental 
change. If this concept of differential environments is extended to humans using 
socioeconomic status as a proxy for the degree of enrichment, similar patterns emerge. 
Drug-use is correlated with socioeconomic status, with those in the lowest annual income 
groups reporting more substance-use-related problems (Baptiste-Roberts & Hossain, 
2018). In addition, unemployed persons are more likely to use and abuse drugs (Bali, 
Raisch, Moffett, & Khan, 2013; Henkel, 2010). In both of these scenarios, there is a 
paucity of other alternatives available due to a lack of resources. In those situations, the 




available decrease. This shift in relative values over time is supported by models of 
consumption which show that as the relative value and availability of the alternative 
reward decreases, the relative value and consumption of the drug option will increase 
until it reaches a point where the drug is chosen exclusively (Rachlin, 1997). Since these 
alterations happen over time, our current  study may not have detected shifts in behavior 
because it was only able to access decision-making at a local utility level, even when 
using the macro-level analysis of choice, because the consequences were not far enough 
out into the future. Therefore, even though there does not appear to be changes in 
maximizing local utility (i.e. the present moment) there may be changes in global utility 
as it deals with consequences further in the future such as loss of rewards, job loss, social 
isolation, etc. Studies that manipulate opportunity costs and loss of alternatives could be 
useful in extending the predictions of relative value theory as it relates to long-term 
choice for the drug.  
 
CHAPTER 6.  FUTURE DIRECTIONS FOR TREATMENT  
Using a relative value framework to explain drug-taking behavior may also have 
implications for the treatment of SUD. One popular treatment plan has been the token 
economy developed in the 1960s for use with psychiatric patients (Ayllon & Azrin 1965, 
1968) and classrooms or other populations (O’Leary & Drabman, 1971). In these original 
procedures, the aim was to increase positive behaviors through the presentation of a 
second-order conditioned reinforcer, a token that could be later exchanged for a reward. 
The extension of this concept to the treatment of SUDs is called contingency 
management. In these treatment plans, “choices” to abstain from drugs, verified by 
negative urine screens, are rewarded with money, vouchers, or tokens that can be 
exchanged for goods or services. Contingency management appears to alter the relative 
value of drug rewards by providing a salient alternative to the drug. Contingency 
management has been shown to effectively increase rates of abstinence for stimulants, 
alcohol, opioids, and tobacco (see review by Stitzer & Petry, 2006). Additionally, one 
offshoot of the contingency management model called the Therapeutic Workplace, in 




access to a working environment, has shown long-lasting effects in patient abstinence 
(Silverman et al., 2012; Silverman, Holtyn, & Morrison, 2016). These therapies appear to 
be shifting the relative value of the drug and non-drug alternatives to produce their 
abstinence effects as one study found that ratings of non-drug activities were graded 
amongst CUD patients receiving contingency management treatment, such that the 
highest scores for non-drug activities corresponded with the highest levels of abstinence 
(Rogers et al., 2008).  
Other examples of treatment plans focusing on shifting the relative value of the 
drug are motivational interventions such as mindfulness technique training (Mindfulness-
Oriented Recovery Enhancement (MORE; see review by Garland et al., 2019; Garland, 
Froeliger & Howard, 2014) and Mindfulness-Based Relapse Prevention (MBRP; see 
review by Witkiewtiz, Lustyk, & Bowen, 2013) that work to train the cultivation of 
positive thoughts that “savor” experiences associated with drug-free states and teach 
patients to learn to better cope with uncomfortable or challenging situations. These 
mindfulness studies have been effective in reducing reports of craving, especially in 
response to negative affect (Garland et al., 2016; Bowen et al., 2009). Additionally, in a 
recent meta-analysis, various mindfulness-related therapies were found to promote 
abstinence better than other control conditions (treatment as usual; Cavicchioli, Movalli, 
& Maffei, 2018).  
An existing, first-line treatment method that can be explained from a relative value 
perspective is maintenance therapy, also known as pharmacotherapy. In these treatments, 
the drug of abuse is replaced by another drug that mimics the effects of the original drug 
but has a lower abuse liability and/or is less likely to lead to overdose if misused. For 
example, methadone, used for Opioid Use Disorder (OUD), is a potent agonist at the mu 
opioid receptor but absorbs slowly and does not generate an intense “high.” Maintenance 
therapies are clinically effective in reducing mortality rates among people with OUD 
(National Academies of Science, Engineering, & Medicine, 2019.). When viewing these 
therapies from a holistic perspective, it appears that they might also cause a shift in the 
relative value of the drug much the same as the therapies discussed above. By 




maintenance therapies can stave off craving and withdrawal symptoms allowing the 
patient some relief from the need to take the drug to avoid the negative withdrawal 
symptoms. The removal of the need to use/pursue the drug, allows the patient to use time 
and/or resources towards other alternatives that may not have been available previously 
(Bart, 2012). The maintenance drugs function as a substitute for the drug of abuse, just 
like money did in contingency management, and thus reduces the relative value of the 
drug.  
The combination of contingency management and maintenance therapy has been 
very effective in reducing positive urinalysis, and thus abstinence outcomes (Griffith et 
al., 2000). Contingency management combined with methadone maintenance performed 
better than cognitive behavioral therapy, methadone maintenance alone, and contingency 
management combined with cognitive behavioral therapy (Rawson, et al., 2002). 
Additionally, patients who received contingency management as well as methadone had 
significantly longer periods of abstinence from opioids and cocaine relative to either 
treatment alone (Schottenfeld et al., 2005). The combination of two therapies that reduce 
the relative value of the drug appears to have an additive effect, further reducing the 
relative value of the drug and producing higher rates of long-term abstinence than either 
therapy alone. The effectiveness of these types of treatments gives credence to the idea 
that the decision-making mechanisms involved in valuation process are not irrevocably 
impaired by chronic drug use and that choice for drug reinforcers is sensitive to 
manipulations in relative value through a change in environmental contingencies. Studies 
focused on behavioral and environmental changes, alongside pharmacological 
interventions may prove useful in reducing the harm done by SUD.  
 
CHAPTER 7. CONCLUSION  
Given that addiction is seen as a behavioral disorder with an increasingly complex 
interplay between individual use, environment, and an ever-evolving understanding of 
neurobiological mechanisms, addiction researchers must remain open to the influences of 




most robust theories of addiction and reduce the harm caused by SUD and drug misuse.  
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